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Abstract  
 
 
This thesis examines the impact of the European Union (EU) on the fight against high-
level political corruption in Bulgaria and Romania from 2007 to 2013. Rather than being 
the result of internal historical or cultural processes, I argue – in line with the theory of 
Europeanization – that the fight against corruption in these two countries is driven by 
the adaptational pressure exerted by the EU on the relevant national political actors 
(governments and parliaments). Using process-tracing, I show how this pressure wielded 
principally by the Commission via the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) 
and reinforced by some Member States through Schengen-membership conditionality 
leads to concrete legal and institutional reforms facilitating the control of high-level 
corruption. In particular, I find that when the Commission resorts to negative incentives 
(high adaptational pressure) domestic political will to adopt the desired changes 
increases correspondingly. Overall, I evaluate the CVM as an effective EU tool for 
tackling corruption in Bulgaria and Romania and I consequently recommend the 
implementation of a supranational monitoring system of this kind on a universal basis as 
to provide better guarantees that the fundamental values and principles of the EU are 
observed across all Member States at all times.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
he European Union (EU) is a community of states bound above all by a set of 
values and principles, among which the rule of law stands probably as the most 
sacred. In order to adhere to this very exclusivist club of states which is the EU, 
candidate countries are required – and monitored for that matter – to adopt both 
declaratively and in practice these core values, norms and rules of the Union, more 
concretely referred to by politicians, technocrats, journalists and scholars alike as the 
acquis communautaire. Thus, should incompatibilities in legislation and/or the 
functioning of democratic institutions exist between an applicant country and the EU, 
the first will have to address the requests of the latter and, if necessary, modify its 
legislation and institutional behaviour correspondingly so that a more profound 
integration will be achieved. The more integrated into the Union, the more guarantees 
are offered by the respective state that, once inside the community, it will cooperate 
effectively and harmoniously with the other European actors (be them Member States or 
European institutions).   
However, this plan is not always followed in its exact steps and economic or political 
interests may at times surpass in importance the compatibility criteria. This is why, as 
many consider today, Bulgaria and Romania might have joined the EU prematurely; that 
is, before they were prepared to meet the common standards of the Union. Specifically, 
the yet unresolved matters concerning the endemic corruption within the two countries 
have led some Member States1 to continuously postpone the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania to the passport-free Schengen zone as they fear that once borders are 
completely lifted, criminality from Eastern Europe (not only from Bulgaria and Romania 
but also from their non-EU neighbours) will flow into their societies on a massive and 
uncontrollable scale.   
How justified are these allegations? Have Bulgaria and Romania achieved any 
progress regarding the fight against corruption since coming under the umbrella of the 
EU? More interestingly, to what extent does the EU influence the fight against 
high-level political corruption in these two newly adjoined states?   
                                                          
1 Notably the Netherlands, Finland and Germany. 
T
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The aims of this Master thesis are twofold. The primary goal of the investigation is to 
find whether a connection can be established between European integration processes 
and the fight against corruption in Bulgaria and Romania. Said differently, I ask if the 
EU can exert any tangible influence over the relevant domestic actors in Bulgaria and 
Romania to stimulate them to enact legal and institutional reforms aimed at combating 
corruption effectively. The subsidiary purpose is to see whether any progress can be 
observed in these two states when it comes to controlling corruption. I focus mainly on 
high-level political corruption; nevertheless, I also provide as background information 
data and interpretations of the general perceptions of corruption, in recent years, in 
Bulgaria, Romania and – for comparison – the other EU Member States.    
In order to address the topic, research question and aims of this Master thesis I draw 
on Europeanization as my theoretical framework. I argue that the adaptational pressure 
wielded by the European Commission via the CVM and reinforced by some Member 
States through Schengen-membership conditionality has led to relative progress in both 
countries concerning the control of high-level political corruption. Rather than being a 
genuine desideratum derived from a genuine understanding of what corruption and its 
effects entail for the wellbeing of society, I argue that the ‘struggle’ of Bulgaria and 
Romania to diminish internal corruption is rooted more in the interests of the two 
countries to meet specific EU-related objectives on their political agenda. In particular, 
joining the Schengen zone has been a powerful incentive for complying with the EU’s 
requests in this matter.    
The thesis is structured into eight chapters. First, I define conceptually the 
dependent variable of this study (the fight against high-level political corruption). 
Second, I discuss what has been written so far on this subject principally within the EU 
and with a focus on Bulgaria and Romania. Third, I describe the theory of 
Europeanization and the subsequent hypotheses. Fourth, I present the distinctive 
elements of the research design of this investigation (case selection, methodology, 
indicators and sources). Fifth, I provide a background overview of the historical, cultural 
and political factors that have shaped the context in which corruption and the fight 
against corruption in Bulgaria and Romania take place. Sixth, using process-tracing I 
analyse how the EU, notably through the CVM, has impacted the fight against 
corruption in Bulgaria and Romania. Seventh, I evaluate the findings in relation to the 
hypotheses. Finally, the thesis ends with a list of conclusions, limitations and 
implications.  
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PART I: FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
 
1. CONCEPT DEFINITION 
 
The dependent variable of this study is the fight against high-level political corruption. 
As such, it includes three dimensions. First, central to the analysis is the fight against 
corruption (a process encompassing rules, institutions and action) rather than corruption 
itself (an indicator). Although information on general levels of corruption is provided, its 
role is merely to set the context and the starting point for the in-depth discussion. From 
this perspective, the dependent variable can be understood as political will to control 
corruption. Second, the emphasis will be on fighting high-level corruption, as opposed to 
everyday petty corruption. This is not to say that the latter is less of a phenomenon than 
the first in Bulgaria and Romania. The choice I made underlines a matter of gravity; the 
particular concern posed by high-level corruption. As Justice Louis Brandeis put it, “[i]f 
the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy” (cited in Entin 2011: 257). Third, at the 
core of the dependent variable lies the radial concept ‘political corruption’, defined by 
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi as “a mode of social organization characterized by the regular 
distribution of public goods on a nonuniversalistic basis that mirrors the vicious 
distribution of power within such societies” (2006: 87). Despite being present in all forms 
of regimes, political corruption causes, perhaps, the greatest harm to democracies, as “it 
is more likely to be exposed under conditions of constitutionalism and freedom press, and 
because this exposure can do great damage to political legitimacy, on which democracies 
depend for their survival much more than authoritarian regimes” (Johnston et al. 1991: 
47). Hence, the need to reduce it (‘eliminate’ would not be realistic). The stress on 
‘political’ is also to distinguish between corruption occurring in the realm of public affairs 
and that within the private finance, which is not an issue to be investigated here. 
Nevertheless, the two are certainly intertwined as it is not unseen that enterprises 
established in the private sector bribe their way in parliament or government to obtain 
financial stimuli, advantages of all sorts or a contract in a governmental programme.    
In light of these considerations, I will use ‘high-level political corruption’ to refer to 
senior officials in the state hierarchy abusing their institutional function and position for 
illegitimate private gain through extortion, bribery, nepotism, patronage, money 
laundering, influence peddling or other such means. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Corruption exists, probably, since time immemorial. Accordingly, there is a vast and 
abundant literature that goes all the way back to Ancient Greece, discussing what 
corruption is, why it is, and how can it be removed.  
Some (political) philosophers have emphasized the moral dimension of corruption. 
Machiavelli, for example, saw corruption as “the process by which the virtú of the citizen 
was undermined and eventually destroyed” (Friedrich 1999: 18). Similarly, Rousseau 
argued that men are born good but are corrupted by society and politics. Along the same 
lines of morality but closer to the religious sphere, the Swiss Protestant pastor Jean 
Frédéric Ostervald published a Treatise Concerning the Causes of the Present Corruption 
of Christians and the Remedies thereof where he affirmed – among many other things – 
that “the greatest part of men’s vices proceeds from their temporal affairs” (1711: 217). 
Other philosophers stressed the political connotation of corruption. In this sense, 
Aristotle is among the first who tackled the subject when describing tyranny “as a 
corrupt form of monarchy” (Heidenheimer et al. 2009: 3). Much later, in the Age of 
Enlightenment, Montesquieu arrived to a similar conclusion in his famous work The 
Spirit of Laws where he referred to corruption as the pathway to despotism.  
In more recent times, Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) and Batory (2012) pay substantial 
attention to institution-building in the area concerning the fight against corruption. 
Mungiu-Pippidi affirms that the main challenge for emerging democracies is not merely 
to imitate the anticorruption institutions of Western societies, but to replicate also the 
historical processes that favoured universalism at the expense of particularism (2006: 
96). This is why, for instance, the importation of the ombudsman – a Scandinavian 
institution – by many Eastern European states, following their repudiation of the 
communist socio-political establishment, did not result in the most efficient outcomes as 
these countries did not assimilate also the unwritten values and perceptions upon which 
the institution was originally founded (2006: 96). Batory investigates why anticorruption 
laws fail in Central Eastern Europe and argues that “[w]hile most people condemn 
corruption themselves, evidence abounds around them that their countrymen do not, or 
at least not sufficiently, refrain from corrupt practices – thus undermining their own 
resolve” (2012: 78). Correspondingly, with scandals of corruption revolving around 
government institutions permanently, the leadership in these respective states lacks the 
necessary credibility and legitimacy to carry out anticorruption policies. While Batory’s 
arguments are generally sound, the recommendations she puts forward are questionable. 
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For instance, the proposal based on the US example “to provide a positive incentive to 
those disclosing information of public interest in the form of a fee or share of the value of 
the public assets recovered” (2012: 79) could bring to surface old dreadful habits in 
societies which not that long ago were encouraged by the secret police to disclose 
information on the activity of friends or family in exchange for different kinds of 
advantages. 
Furthermore, there is the scholarly literature analysing corruption within the EU. In 
this respect, Christine Arnold, Eliyahu Sapir and Galina Zapryanova (2012) link public 
trust in the EU institutions to corruption by finding quantitatively that “people living in 
countries with low levels of corruption, low public expenses on welfare and high decision-
making power in the European Union are less likely to trust EU institutions than people 
in countries with high levels of corruption, high expenses on social spending and low 
decision making power” (2012: 30). From a qualitative viewpoint, the idea that 
widespread corruption leads to higher trust in supranational institutions is shared also 
by Peter de Ruiter, the Chairman of the Dutch-Romanian Chamber of Commerce, who, in 
a public address on the progress made by Romania in the EU, affirmed that Romania is 
still marked by the “foreign prince syndrome” (Clingendael, 12 February 2013) – an 
allusion that Romanians see their country as ungovernable by themselves. Historically, 
the election of Karl von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen as king of Romania in the 19th 
century represents a case in point echoed, according to de Ruiter, by the contemporary 
euro-optimism manifested by the Romanians.   
Finally, there is a body of literature specifically on the performance of Bulgaria and 
Romania in the context of the EU. Mihaiela Gugiu’s study on the lessons learned from 
the accession of Romania concludes with the assertion that “through a combination of 
‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, the EU influenced the Romanian political will to combat corruption 
at both rhetorical and demonstrated levels” (2012: 444) during 1997 and 2006. On the 
other hand, Svetlozar Andreev opines that after accession, “the problem of corruption has 
been a particularly salient theme for the political elites of both countries and it led to the 
paralysis of the cabinet in Romania during the first year of its membership and to the 
rise of powerful populist alternatives in Bulgaria” (2009: 390). According to Andreev, 
what differentiates Bulgaria and Romania the most from the rest of the ex-communist 
bloc that joined the EU in 2004 is the “apparent inability to swiftly deal with the political 
and social challenges cropping up after accession, as well as to adequately respond to the 
process of Europeanization” (2009: 391). Conversely, Vachudova and Spendzharova 
consider that linking EU funding and Schengen entry to satisfying CVM benchmarks has 
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indeed helped trigger reforms. A point of criticism both to Andreev and Vachudova and 
Spendzharova is their apparent division of the Bulgarian and Romanian political spectra 
into ‘good parties’ and ‘bad parties’. While Andreev labels the centre-right GERB in 
Bulgaria as “populist”2, Vachudova and Spendzharova see it as reformist, contrasting its 
left-wing “clientelist” predecessor in power, the BSP. On the other hand, Vachudova and 
Spendzharova also affirm that “should the PSD control the next government, corruption 
will deepen and the balance of power will shift (further) against those working for 
domestic institutional change” 3  (2012: 12). Recent developments in Romania do not 
support this statement. For example, the courts’ definitive decisions to send former 
prime-minister Adrian Năstase (PSD) and other senior PSD officials from past 
governments to prison occurred after Victor Ponta (PSD) became prime-minister. Today, 
cross-party analyses are much easier to conduct as all main parties in Bulgaria and 
Romania have alternated in government since accession.   
Another methodological problem identified in the existing literature (see notably 
Iacob 2012, Trapp 2011) is the use of the CPI as an instrument to determine whether 
corruption has increased or decreased. As discussed in Chapter 4, Transparency 
International does not always rely on the same sources nor does it always follow the 
same methodology. Consequently, any comparisons or trends based on this data are 
methodologically inaccurate. I use the CPI simply to stress that Bulgaria and Romania 
are the crucial cases for the theory employed here.   
Moreover, some authors (Iacob 2012; Vachudova and Spendzharova 2012) see EU 
funds as leverage for generating anticorruption reforms. A judgment of this kind is 
rather problematic considering the two sides of the coin in this particular matter. While 
indeed the suspension of EU funds can lead to some political consequences (i.e. see in 
particular Bulgaria), it is also true that EU funds provide by themselves an opportunity 
for corruption. OLAF, the Commission’s anti-fraud organization, has identified numerous 
cases of corruption linked to the EU funds. Therefore, it is complicated to establish 
precisely to what extent EU funds represent leverage for anticorruption ends and not an 
incentive for corrupt behaviour. For this reason, I stress more the immaterial leverage; 
the political stimulus: Schengen membership. 
In complementarity with the other articles, this thesis includes the very recent and 
significant events that continue to shape the fight against corruption in both countries 
and thus tries to provide an updated assessment of the situation. 
                                                          
2 At the time Andreev wrote the article GERB had not yet been elected in government.  
3 At the time Vachudova and Spendzharova wrote the paper PSD had not yet taken office.  
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
I adopt Europeanization as the central theory explaining the transformations and 
adaptations occurring in the Bulgarian and Romanian political establishments, with a 
particular focus on anticorruption institutions, laws and practices. Said differently, I 
argue that European integration leads to comprehensive measures to fight high-level 
political corruption in Bulgaria and Romania. 
Several contributions to and interpretations of Europeanization have been made in 
recent years, developing this concept into a theory in its own right. It has been viewed, 
for instance, in terms of a historical process; as “the emergence and the development at 
the European level of distinct structures of governance” (Risse et al. cited in Radaelli and 
Pasquier 2007: 36). Other scholars observe it as a theory of European integration. In this 
latter sense, Vink and Graziano define Europeanization broadly as the “domestic 
adaptation to European regional integration” (2007: 7). To Ladrech, it represents an 
“incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that 
EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national 
politics and policy-making” (1994: 69). For the purpose of this paper, I hereby adopt 
Radaelli’s most inclusive interpretation, according to which Europeanization consists of:  
 
“processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared 
beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions 
and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and 
public policies” (cited in Ladrech 2010: 15)  
 
Europeanization, as a theory of European integration, is therefore characterized by the 
following main features. First, it is a top-down approach. This means that the cause-and-
effect chain starts from the supranational EU level, where decisions are adopted, and 
goes down to the national levels where policies are implemented. There are of course 
variations in the understanding of the EU decision-making system. Arguably, states first 
aggregate their preferences at the domestic level and then they upload them on the EU 
level (i.e. see Andrew Moravcsik’s theory of liberal intergovernamentalism). On the other 
hand, as Ladrech (2010) points out, the implementation of decisions follows rather the 
opposite route, as in the case of national governments. The top-down approach is even 
more obvious with the new Member States which are generally downloaders of acquis, 
especially before but also immediately after accession.  
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Second, the intensity of Europeanization’s causal mechanisms is dependent on the fit 
or misfit between the EU, on one side, and the individual Member States, on the other. 
The more compatible or similar in legislation, norms, values etc. the two sides are, the 
lower the pressure on the part of the EU to ignite domestic change. Conversely, the wider 
the discrepancies between the two sides, the higher the pressure to reduce the gaps 
(Ladrech 2010: 32).  
Third, the circuit of Europeanization is not direct; intervening factors (i.e. number of 
veto players, formal and informal institutions, norm entrepreneurs etc.) shape the degree 
to which change eventually takes place at the domestic level. That is to say, the 
preferences of the EU are filtered at national level by the different agents deciding 
whether or how to materialize these preferences.  
Fourth, Europeanization does not end with accession to the EU. Indeed, the most 
visible impact of Europeanization can be observed in the pre-accession stage when the 
EU exerts a real “transformative power” (Leonard 2005) through membership 
conditionality. For candidate countries, the EU stands for peace, prosperity and stability 
(van Ham 2008: 241) and thus the aspiration to become part of this exclusivist club of 
states drives them to comply with the requirements and benchmarks set by Brussels. 
However, as seen with the 2004 and notably 2007 enlargements, problems still need to be 
addressed even after accession. Transition rules, safeguard clauses and monitoring 
schemes are set in place to prolong the leverage previously derived from membership 
conditionality and to guarantee as much as possible that the new Member States will 
maintain or speed up the pace of reforms.  
Fifth, Europeanization involves socialization and institutionalization (Radaelli and 
Pasquier 2007: 37). EU and national officials interact with one another on an 
institutional basis and exchange information, norms, ‘ways of doing things’, paradigms 
etc. The frequency of interactions and the flux of knowledge that comes with it lead 
eventually to the establishment of new institutions or the consolidation of existing ones. 
Contacts create presence, presence generates habitude, habitude sources legitimacy and 
legitimacy strengthens institutional capacity and autonomy. Through the process of 
socialization, EU institutions emerge, mature and come to wield their own influence over 
the decision-making system, becoming active players of Europeanization. The European 
Council is a case in point. It started in the 1960s as an informal summit and was 
gradually formalized, being mentioned in the EU treaties for the first time in 1986, with 
the Single European Act. Later, with the Lisbon Treaty (2007), the European Council 
was acknowledged as an EU institution, with specific powers and roles.  
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Figure 1. The causal path of Europeanization 
 
Source: Robert Ladrech, Europeanization and National Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p.42. 
 
Considering that Bulgaria and Romania are new comers in the EU, I start from the 
premise that a ‘lack of compatibility’ has existed between the EU on the one side, and 
Bulgaria and Romania on the other, in accordance with the goodness-of-fit principle. This 
lack of compatibility resulted naturally in a conflict4 of preferences (i.e. what kind of 
policies should be pursued). Through socialization, the preferences of the EU have been 
brought down to the domestic mediating factors responsible for triggering action. In line 
with the logic of Europeanization, I make the assumption that the EU has generally 
managed to impose its views over the Bulgarian and Romanian paradigms and thus the 
relevant national actors transposed the EU’s preferences into action (i.e. reforms, 
changes etc.). This action has in turn led to institutionalization, by which process new 
structures and legal frameworks have been created in Bulgaria and Romania.    
Therefore, I formulate the following main hypotheses:  
H1. EU adaptational pressure leads to progress in the fight against high-level 
political corruption.  
H2. The greater the adaptational pressure of the EU, the greater the political will to 
fight high-level corruption.  
In the actual analysis on Bulgaria and Romania, other adjacent aspects (i.e. possible 
differences and similarities between the two cases etc.) will be discussed as well.  
  
                                                          
4 Here, ‘conflict’ is used in the sense of difference of views, opinions, ideas etc. 
-15- 
 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
  
  
4.1. CASE SELECTION 
Bulgaria and Romania are the most corrupt countries in the European Union. From a 
methodological standpoint, they represent crucial cases. Harry Eckstein defines a crucial 
case as one “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s 
validity, or conversely, must not fit equally well with any rule contrary to that proposed”, 
adding that “in a crucial case it must be extremely difficult or clearly petulant, to dismiss 
any finding contrary to the theory as simply ‘deviant’ (due to chance, or the operation of 
unconsidered factors)” (cited in George and Bennett 2005: 120). Applied here, this means 
that if Europeanization works in these least favourable cases (Bulgaria and Romania), 
then it should principally prove its validity everywhere else in this specific problem (fight 
against corruption).  
To support the statement made in the beginning of this section, I draw on the indexes 
of Freedom House (NIT) and Transparency International (CPI) – two of the most popular 
existing corruption perception measurements. I present the aggregate data in the form of 
comprehensive charts (Chart 1 and Chart 2) as well as tables (Table 1 and Table 2) with 
exact scores per country, per year including multiannual average scores and definitions 
or interpretations of the concepts under scrutiny (what each organization is in fact 
measuring).  
There are three significant differences between the datasets. First, Transparency 
International provides a longer list of cases and a wider time range in contrast to 
Freedom House, whose country-list is limited to the ex-communist states and whose first 
measurements start with 2003. From this point of view, the CPI is much more complex, 
in terms of both case analysis and time perspective. Nonetheless, for the purpose of this 
paper, even a 10-year assessment would be sufficient so as to give a general idea of how 
individual countries performed recently regarding their control of corruption. At the 
same time, the omission of the other EU countries in the Freedom House index is not 
particularly problematic as it is difficult to imagine that any of the Western European 
states would score significantly higher than Bulgaria or Romania (which represent the 
main focus of this paper).   
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Corruption perceptions in the ex-communist EU Member States
(2003-2012, Freedom House)
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Croatia
 
 
The exact values/scores per country, per year can be found below, in Table 1.  
Source: Own processing of the data provided in Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2012, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2012%20%20NIT%20Tables.pdf.  
 
Table 1. Corruption perceptions in the ex-communist EU Member States (Freedom House) 
Country 
Score 
Average 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Croatia 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.25 4 4.550 
Romania 4.5 4.5 4.25 4.25 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.150 
Bulgaria 4.25 4.25 4 3.75 3.75 3.5 4 4 4 4 3.950 
Lithuania 3.5 3.5 3.75 4 4 3.75 3.75 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.675 
Czech Rep. 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.375 
Latvia 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.25 3 3 3.25 3.25 3.5 3.25 3.300 
Slovakia 3.25 3.25 3 3 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.75 3.5 3.5 3.300 
Hungary 2.75 2.75 2.75 3 3 3 3.25 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.100 
Poland 2.5 2.5 3 3.25 3 3 2.75 3.25 3.25 3.25 2.975 
Estonia 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.25 2.25 2.450 
Slovenia 2 2 2 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.25 2.250 
NOTE:  
1. Croatia is set to become a Member State of the EU on 1 July 2013.  
2. Scores are given on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represents the highest level of control of corruption and 7 the lowest.  
3. Countries are arranged in descending order according to the average scores presented in the last column.  
4. Here, ‘corruption’ looks at “public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on 
financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the eﬃcacy of anticorruption initiatives” (Freedom House 2012).  
Source: Own calculations (average scores) on the basis of the data provided in Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2012, 
available at  http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2012%20%20NIT%20Tables.pdf.  
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Second, in contrast to Freedom House where year-to-year comparisons are possible, 
the occasional alternations in the sources used by Transparency International and its 
radical change of methodology5 in 2012 make such comparisons unviable with the CPI. 
To discourage potential temptations to compare with past records, as of 2012 
Transparency International changed its scale, from 0-10 (used previously) to 0-100. For 
this reason, the 2012 Transparency International scores are not included in Chart 2 or in 
Table 2; nevertheless, they are mentioned in the text box that accompanies the chart. To 
avoid any doubt, charts 1 and especially 2 are intended not to illustrate trends but 
simply to place visually Bulgaria and Romania on the EU hierarchy.  
Third, the concepts analysed by the two organizations differ to some extent. Whereas 
Freedom House concentrates on “public perceptions of corruption, the business interests 
of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the eﬃcacy 
of anticorruption initiatives” (Freedom House 2012a), Transparency International relates 
to the abuse of public power and focuses on “bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public 
procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and on questions that probe the strength 
and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in the public sector” thus covering both the 
administrative and political aspects of corruption (Transparency International 2011a).  
The data from Transparency International and Freedom House suggests that 
Romania and Bulgaria (in this order) have been the most corrupt countries in the EU. 
The only notable difference concerns the position of Croatia, a to-be Member State. While 
Transparency International places it, on average, below Romania and Bulgaria, Freedom 
House rates it as generally more corrupt than both. However, if we consider only the 
latest assessment6 of Freedom House, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania appear equally 
corrupt. Moreover, given that the concept measured by Transparency International is 
closer to the focus of this paper (corruption in the public sector involving officials) it 
would not be ‘unsafe’ to conclude that, statistically, Romania and Bulgaria have been the 
most corrupt states in the EU and that this top remains valid also after the coming 
accession of Croatia to the EU.  
 
  
                                                          
5 See Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2012: An updated methodology”, 
available at http://www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2012_CPIUpdatedMethodology 
_EMBARGO_EN.pdf.  
6 Note that the NIT index permits country-to-country and year-to-year comparisons.  
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The exact values/scores can be found in Table 2, presented on the following page. CPI 2012 uses a different methodology 
and scale; therefore, its data is not included here. In CPI 2012, Bulgaria registered a score of 41, Romania 44 and Croatia 
46. Greece registered the lowest score in the EU (36) while Italy performed lower than Romania, with a score of 42. 
Sources: Own processing of the data selected from CPI 1998, CPI 1999, CPI 2000, CPI 2001, CPI 2002, CPI 2003, CPI 
2004, CPI 2005, CPI 2006, CPI 2007, CPI 2008, CPI 2009, CPI 2010 and CPI 2011, published by Transparency 
International and available online at www.transparency.org.  
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Table 2. Corruption perceptions in the EU Member States (Transparency International) 
 
Country 
Score 
Average 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Romania 3 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.21 
Bulgaria 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.9 4 3.9 4.1 4 4 4.1 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.71 
Croatia n.a. 2.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.4 4.1 4.1 4 3.75 
Latvia 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.8 4 4.2 4.7 4.8 5 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.00 
Slovakia 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 4 4.3 4.7 4.9 5 4.5 4.3 4 4.13 
Poland 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 4 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.2 4.6 5 5.3 5.5 4.27 
Greece 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.7 3.8 3.5 3.4 4.31 
Czech Rep. 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.48 
Lithuania n.a. 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.9 5 4.8 4.65 
Italy 4.6 4.7 4.6 5.5 5.2 5.3 4.8 5 4.9 5.2 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.9 4.76 
Hungary 5 5.2 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.8 5 5.2 5.3 5.1 5.1 4.7 4.6 5.01 
Cyprus n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.1 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.3 6.4 6.6 6.3 6.3 5.96 
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.8 6.6 6.4 5.8 5.8 5.2 5.6 5.6 5.97 
Estonia n.a. 6 5.5 5.2 6 5.9 6 6.1 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.4 5.9 6.10 
Slovenia 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.5 6 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.10 
Portugal 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.1 5.8 6 6.1 6.33 
Spain 6.1 6.6 7 7 7.1 6.9 7.1 7 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.65 
Belgium 5.4 5.3 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.3 7.1 7.1 7.5 6.88 
France 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.9 7.1 7.5 7.4 7.3 6.9 6.9 6.8 7 6.91 
Ireland 8.2 7.7 7.2 7.5 6.9 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.7 8 8 7.5 7.57 
Germany 7.9 8 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.2 8 7.8 7.9 8 7.9 8 7.85 
Austria 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 8 8.4 8.7 8.6 8.1 8.1 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.99 
UK 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.4 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.8 8.33 
Luxembourg 8.7 8.8 8.6 8.7 9 8.7 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.5 8.5 8.56 
Netherlands 9 9 8.9 8.8 9 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.7 9 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.9 8.86 
Sweden 9.5 9.4 9.4 9 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.27 
Denmark 10 10 9.8 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.53 
Finland 9.6 9.8 10 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.6 9.4 9 8.9 9.2 9.4 9.53 
NOTE: 1. Croatia is set to become a Member State of the EU on 1 July 2013. 2. Scores are given on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 is ‘highly corrupt’ and 10 is ‘very clean’. 3. 
Countries are arranged in ascending order according to the average values presented in the last column. 4. The CPI focuses on “corruption in the public sector, or corruption 
which involves public officials, civil servants or politicians”. 
Source: Own calculations (average scores) on the basis of the data provided in CPI 1998, CPI 1999, CPI 2000, CPI 2001, CPI 2002, CPI 2003, CPI 2004, CPI 2005, CPI 2006, 
CPI 2007, CPI 2008, CPI 2009, CPI 2010 and CPI 2011, published by Transparency International and available online at www.transparency.org.  
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4.2. METHODOLOGY  
The method I employ to highlight my findings is process-tracing. Process-tracing, as a 
tool of social science, is defined as the “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence 
selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the 
investigator” (Collier 2011: 823). “In process-tracing”, George and Bennett explain, “the 
researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other 
sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in 
fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variable in that case” (2005: 6). 
Furthermore, when it comes to the EU and Europeanization, Ladrech notes that 
“[p]rocess tracing is the most widely adopted research strategy, and one that lends itself 
most readily to examples of policy change” also being “the most explicit in terms of 
establishing, or rather attempting to establish, the causal link between observed changes 
and developments at the EU level” (2010: 40).  
Accordingly, I use this method to establish the causal mechanism between the EU 
system and the exact steps made in the process of fighting high-level political corruption 
in Bulgaria and Romania. Therefore, the cause-and-effect chain has two ends. At one end 
stands primarily the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) as the EU’s most 
significant instrument for tackling corruption. The CVM came about on 13 December 
2006 when the European Commission adopted a decision “establishing a mechanism for 
cooperation and verification of progress […] to address specific benchmarks in the areas 
of judicial reform and the fight against corruption” in Bulgaria and Romania7. This 
mechanism entered into force on 1 January 2007 and is still in effect in both states. The 
‘verification of progress’ takes the form of biannual reports8 elaborated and presented 
publicly by the Commission. The value of the CVM for the analysis is twofold. On the one 
hand, it represents an external diagnosis on the state of the fight against corruption as it 
contains an independent evaluation; on the other hand, it represents an institutional 
body in itself (it is a cooperation and verification mechanism after all) intended to 
produce reactions. Effectively, the question I ask is whether the criticism presented by 
the Commission through the CVM reports and reinforced by other actors in the EU (i.e. 
national executives) triggers corresponding actions in Bulgaria and Romania regarding 
the fight against high-level corruption. These actions constitute the other end of the 
chain.    
                                                          
7 See further European Commission’s Decision of 13/12/2006 [C(2006)6569], clause no.6 regarding 
Romania and Decision of 13/12/2006 [C(2006)6570], clause no.6 on Bulgaria, both available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/. 
8 An interim report issued usually during winter and a full report published in summer.  
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4.3. OPERATIONALIZATION 
The indicators I refer to in order to assess progress are principally laws, institutions and 
track record. More specifically, should the adaptational pressure of the EU lead to (1) the 
adoption of new laws or the amending of existing ones, facilitating the fight against high-
level corruption; and/or (2) the emergence of new anticorruption institutions; and/or (3) a 
developing track record in anticorruption practices (concrete results, i.e. indictments and 
convictions), I will conclude that the influence of the EU generates progress in the fight 
against high-level political corruption in Bulgaria and Romania (H1).  
By adaptational pressure I understand any form of judgment on the part of the EU 
vis-à-vis Bulgaria and Romania that ranges from positive incentives such as praises (low 
adaptational pressure) to negative incentives such as criticism, threats and sanctions 
(high adaptational pressure). Similarly, I will see high domestic political will whenever 
the leadership (i.e. government or parliament) of the two countries responds swiftly to 
the requests of the EU and in maximum accordance with the latter’s preferences. 
Therefore, if the political leadership in Bulgaria and Romania responds promptly and 
correspondingly to any harsh critique of the Commission, I will conclude that greater EU 
adaptational pressure leads to greater domestic political will to fight corruption (H2).  
 
4.4. SOURCES 
For my analysis, I rely largely on the technical documents accompanying the CVM 
reports. These documents contain factual overviews of what has been achieved in the 
direction of meeting the CVM benchmarks within six-months (for the interim reports) 
and one-year (for the summer reports) time segments up until 2013. Alternatively, I 
draw on media articles, scholarly literature and official statements, mainly to fill in the 
potential gaps and to better illustrate causality.  
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PART II: ANALYSIS 
 
5. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS  
 
5.1. HISTORY 
Although many derive the current state of corruption from the deprivations that 
characterized the communist regime, corruption should be seen as a century-old cultural 
habit shaped by successive historical processes and only amplified – eventually – by 
communism. Approximately 100 years before communism was even born as a political 
regime in Romania, Grigore Alexandru Ghica, the last local reigning prince of Moldova, 
declared the following about the necessity of having a foreign prince as head of state of 
the United Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia (later Romania), reflecting 
retrospectively on his own experience as ruler: 
 
“If they [the United Principalities of Wallachia and Moldova] were to be ruled by a local 
prince, this would again result in the greatest harm, I know this from experience. It is 
with shame that I must confess that during the seven years of my reign in Moldova [1849-
1856] I acted unfairly and unlawfully many times; my conscience burdens me, may 
gracious God forgive me. But what could I do when I was in kinship and friendship with 
all the nobility? How was I not to make minister my cousin; high chancellor my in-laws; 
foreign minister my son; president of the Assembly my brother-in-law; prefects my 
nephews and friends; and deputy-prefects and sheriffs their own friends? And, if any of 
them would do wrong, condemn the innocent, overtly dishonour someone or confiscate 
one’s fortune, what could I do? Could I always be just?”                         (cited in Preda 2011) 
 
This quote is emblematic for the larger context in which corruption evolved and came to 
be exercised as a standard practice of running the state. Thus, before taking into account 
communism, we have to look back to the historical roots of institutionalized corruption, 
which can be found in the Ottoman occupation.  
The Ottomans ruled – among other nations – also over Bulgaria and the Romanian 
principalities (Transylvania, Moldova and Wallachia), albeit for different lengths of time 
and in different degrees. Bulgaria was directly controlled by the Turks for almost five 
centuries, from the end of the 14th century (more precisely, after the Battle of Nicopolis in 
1396 which marked the fall of the Vidin Tsardom) until the end of the 19th century. 
Moldova and Wallachia gradually became vassal states of the Ottoman Empire 
-23- 
 
throughout the 15th century. In the aftermath of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, 
the United Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia, together with Bulgaria, obtained 
their independence. Transylvania was the least exposed to Ottoman influence: nearly 150 
years of suzerainty, from 1526 (Battle of Mohács) until shortly after the Battle of Vienna 
in 1683, after which it was integrated into the Habsburg (later Austro-Hungarian) 
Empire until 1918 when it joined the Kingdom of Romania.   
Bulgarians experienced the Ottoman occupation more intensively than their 
Northern neighbours. While the Romanian principalities could still keep partial or full 
autonomy over their domestic affairs, Bulgaria was subjected to sharia – the Holy Law of 
Islam. Although religious communities within the empire were organized in millets9 and 
were in principle allowed to live according to their own laws and customs provided that 
taxes were paid regularly to the central authorities, any conflict involving a Muslim 
would be judged in line with the Islamic Law, thus effectively granting Muslims 
prevalence over non-Muslims (in this case the Orthodox Bulgarians). Moreover, non-
Muslims were denied by law certain rights (i.e. carrying swords or buying land) and 
therefore Bulgarians “had to work their way around the pro-Muslim legal system in 
order to survive” (Littlehale 2012: 20). The second-class status along with the 
unrepresentative/illegitimate legal framework encouraged a mentality on the part of 
Bulgarians to bypass formal justice. In a nutshell, the Ottoman rule “compromised the 
development of the ethical political understanding of the rule of law, and restricted its 
meaning within rather narrow limits” (Meurs and Pippidi cited in Littlehale 2012: 21). 
The effect was doubled by the widespread corruption that corroded the Ottoman 
establishment notably after the 17th century. With the decentralization of the empire 
taking place, the government ceased to rotate its law-enforcement officers. This had 
tremendous consequences for the separation of power between the judiciary and the 
executive, at the local level. Before decentralization, local courts analysed cases and 
decided the penalties according to a governmental scheme (i.e. the fines which one had to 
pay for his/her specific crime) while officers with limited temporal mandates in the region 
were in charge of executing the judicial orders (that is, collecting the fines decided by the 
courts). The short-term mandates impeded the fiefholders to forge durable relationships 
with the local judges (kadıs) and manipulate the judicial process to their favour. After 
decentralization, local elites gained extensive power in their regions and, consequently, 
control over the courts – with which they often shared the spoils of unfairly conducted 
                                                          
9 The Arabic word millet literally means ‘nation’ and was used to distinguish between the different 
religious communities living in the Ottoman Empire (i.e. Jewish, Christian, Muslim).  
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trials (Coşgel et al. 2013: 370-371). Moreover, law-enforcement officers had been 
traditionally entitled to keep a percentage of the taxes and fines they collected, as a 
compensation for their service. However, inflation rose rapidly across the empire (so fast 
that fines could not be updated by the government) and thus there was no incentive for 
tax-collectors to follow the legal prescriptions. Instead, “litigants and law enforcers often 
negotiated fines on their own” (Coşgel et al. 2013: 370). Furthermore, during the 17th and 
18th centuries, the courts lost de facto their role of primary arbiters of criminal cases as 
residents preferred to petition administrative or military authorities which most of the 
time issued sentences in the absence of a court ruling (Coşgel et al. 2013: 372).   
Although the Romanian principalities were not affected by the internal dynamics of 
the Ottoman system, they were introduced to a different kind of institutionalized 
corruption, rooted in the suzerainty ties. Local princes, for instance, owed their 
appointment to the benevolence of the sultan. Since the 17th century, this benevolence 
was secured through a special ‘tax’ (mukarrer) paid by the Romanian princes every three 
years to confirm the continuation of their reign, which was separate from the annual 
state tribute (haraç) or the occasional gifts (peșkeș) they were required to offer to the 
imperial court. Consequently, the highest political office in the Romanian principalities 
could only be attained by assiduous lobbying understood in its widest possible sense. 
Candidates to the throne would frequently come from the same noble family and would 
have to compete with one another, sometimes until death. In the end, the one who 
managed to present the best – financial and ideological – guarantees of loyalty to the 
sultan obtained his approval and official nomination to the post10.  
Throughout the centuries, the Ottoman rule installed a cultural attitude of avoiding 
legal mechanisms and processes, encouraging the use of bribes and interpersonal 
relations as institutional means for furthering one’s interest. The legacy left behind by 
the Ottomans was decades later enhanced and perfected by the communist regime. 
Following the demise of the monarchical state in Bulgaria (1946) and Romania (1947) in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, the communist regime was inaugurated with 
fervent support from Moscow. Stalinist-fashioned constitutions were passed in both 
countries (the 1947 Dimitrov Constitution in Bulgaria and the 1948 Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of Romania), consecrating the single-party rule, the banishment of 
private property and the nationalization of all means of production. Contrary to 
establishing an egalitarian society (which was the ultimate purpose), the communist 
                                                          
10 From 1711 (Moldova) / 1716 (Wallachia) until 1821, the sultan chose directly the reigning princes 
from the Greek aristocracy living in Fanar, Istanbul.  
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regime evolved progressively into a totalitarian state where absolute power was 
concentrated into the hands of a few (the nomenklatura) while the large mass of people, 
deposed of all civic rights, suffered in poverty. With no private sector to sustain the 
economy, a general shortage of (basic) goods and services eventually emerged. In 
Romania, the shortage became so severe in the 1980s that the government sought to 
regulate i.e. how many kilograms of meat was a person entitled to consume in the course 
of one year. Thus, in order to have access to these goods and services one had to develop a 
web of personal contacts linked to the nomenklatura. The party leaders were generally 
the only ones who could supply or arrange for the clandestine provision of certain 
commodities – from jeans and movies to even food or proper healthcare.  
Just as the Ottoman governance, the communist regime implanted the mentality 
that one could obtain material or immaterial advantages through bribe and personal 
relations. There is, however, a notable difference between the two historical factors. 
While during the Ottoman times corruption emerged as a way of relating to an 
oppressive and predatory foreign power, during communism it evolved as a means of 
alleviating poverty.   
 
5.2. CULTURE 
The historical experiences outlined above left their imprint on the national cultures of 
Bulgaria and Romania. Geert Hofstede, one of the pioneers of modern cultural studies, 
defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from another” (2001: 9). Using his cross-
country dataset, I point to the similarity of the Bulgarian and Romanian cultures and 
stress the need to appeal more to culture in order to better understand why corruption 
exists and how can it be controlled.  
The four cultural dimensions of particular interest here are power distance, 
individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity and uncertainty avoidance. The 
definitions of these dimensions together with the values for each individual Member 
State of the EU (where available) are provided in Table 3. Each dimension holds some 
explanatory power for the notion of corruption. The extent to which a culture is inclined 
to centralization, whether it is consensus-oriented or driven by competition, the 
prominence of relationships, the degree to which society members feel comfortable with 
uncertainty – all of these aspects substantiate the understanding of corruption and of its 
particular presence in a given society. More specifically, a parallel between Bulgaria and 
Romania along these four dimensions lead to the following points of similitude:   
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First, both countries score relatively high on power distance, as shown in Table 3. 
This means that “people accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and 
which needs no further justification. Hierarchy [...] is seen as reflecting inherent 
inequalities, centralization is popular, subordinates expect to be told what to do and the 
ideal boss is a benevolent autocrat” (2001: 79). From a corruption perspective, power 
concentration may cause the abuse (or the corrupt use) of power.   
Second, both countries appear to have collectivistic cultures. In this sense, belonging 
to a group and forging and relying on relationships are vital. According to Hofstede, 
“[l]oyalty in a collectivist culture is paramount, and over-rides most other societal rules 
and regulations. The society fosters strong relationships where everyone takes 
responsibility for fellow members of their group. In collectivist societies offence leads to 
shame and loss of face, employer/employee relationships are perceived in moral terms 
(like a family link); hiring and promotion decisions take account of the employee’s in-
group” (2001: 209). This is notably evocative for the manner in which interpersonal 
relations can create premises of or foster corrupt behaviour.  
Third, both countries have relatively feminine societies, meaning that conflicts are 
generally resolved through negotiation and compromise – a practice not unseen in the 
past in the relation between the rulers and the ruled in Bulgaria and Romania. 
Fourth, both countries prefer to rather avoid uncertainty. According to Hofstede, 
“[c]ountries exhibiting high uncertainty avoidance maintain rigid codes of belief and 
behaviour and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and ideas. In these cultures there 
is an emotional need for rules (even if the rules never seem to work), time is money, 
people have an inner urge to be busy and work hard, precision and punctuality are the 
norm, innovation may be resisted, security is an important element in individual 
motivation” (2001: 145). This is indicative for understanding why old corrupt habits may 
resist to new efforts of changing an entire paradigm within a society (i.e. since bribing in 
order to procure benefits has worked for so long, why risk changing the method?).   
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Table 3. National cultures in the EU (Hofstede) 
 
Country 
Dimensions 
PDI IDV MAS UAI 
Austria 11 55 79 70 
Belgium 65 75 54 94 
Bulgaria 70 30 40 85 
Croatia 73 33 40 80 
Cyprus n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic 57 58 57 74 
Denmark 18 74 16 23 
Estonia 40 60 30 60 
Finland 33 63 26 59 
France 68 71 43 86 
Germany 35 67 66 65 
Greece 60 35 57 112 
Hungary 46 80 88 82 
Ireland 28 70 68 35 
Italy 50 76 70 75 
Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Luxembourg 40 60 50 70 
Malta 56 59 47 96 
Netherlands 38 80 14 53 
Poland 68 60 64 93 
Portugal 63 27 31 104 
Romania 90 30 42 90 
Slovakia 104 52 110 51 
Slovenia 71 27 19 88 
Spain 57 51 42 86 
Sweden 31 71 5 29 
United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 
PDI stands for ‘Power Distance’ and is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally”. High 
values on this dimension indicate preference for centralization and hierarchy.  
IDV stands for ‘Individualism versus Collectivism’ and it refers to “the degree of interdependence a society 
maintains among its members”. A society’s position on this dimension is reflected in whether people’s self-
image is defined in terms of “I” or “we”. High values on this dimension indicate preference towards 
individualism, whereas low values are characteristic for collectivist cultures.  
MAS stands for ‘Masculinity versus Femininity’ and it refers to the opposition between “preference in society 
for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material reward for success” [a competitive society] and 
“preference for cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life” [a consensus-oriented society]. 
High scores on this dimension indicate masculinity; low values, femininity.  
UAI stands for ‘Uncertainty Avoidance’ and it expresses “the degree to which the members of a society feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity”. Countries exhibiting strong UAI maintain rigid codes of belief 
and behaviour and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a more 
relaxed attitude in which practice counts more than principles.  
NOTE: 1. Values in bold indicate extremes. 2. Croatia is set to become a Member State of the EU on 1 July 
2013. 3. Countries are arranged in alphabetical order.  
Sources: Data and definitions are collected from Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, 
Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications, 2001. 
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5.3. POLITICS 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union on 1 January 2007 and were expected 
to make a fundamental step towards a more profound integration in 2011, by adhering to 
the Schengen zone. The ‘Schengen integration’ is explicitly described in the Treaty of 
Luxembourg11 which stipulates that “[t]he provisions of the Schengen aquis  […] shall be 
binding on and applicable in Bulgaria and Romania from the date of accession” (Art.4.1 
of the Protocol); however, the provisions “shall only apply in each of those States 
pursuant to a European decision of the Council to that effect after verification in 
accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedures that the necessary 
conditions for the application of all parts of the acquis concerned have been met in that 
State” (Art.4.2 of the Protocol). Moreover, the decision on accepting Bulgaria and 
Romania in the Schengen zone rests with the Council which “shall take its decision, after 
consulting the European Parliament, acting with the unanimity of its members 
representing the Governments of the Member States” (Art.4.2 of the Protocol). 
This institutional process was supposed to bring about a favourable conclusion in 
March 2011. Nevertheless, in December 2010, France and Germany considered that “it 
was <<premature>> to let Bulgaria and Romania enter the passport-free travel area” 
(France24, 23 March 2011), so the decision was postponed to September. Meanwhile, on 8 
June 2011, the European Parliament adopted with 487 votes in favour, 77 votes against 
and 29 abstentions a resolution confirming that Romania and Bulgaria complied with all 
the requirements (Legislative Observatory, 8 June 2011). The proposal then came to the 
attention of the Council for final decision on 22 September 2011; however, it failed to 
“receive the unanimous support necessary and was therefore not put to a vote” 
(Legislative Observatory, 22 September 2011). On this occasion, the two opposing 
Member States were Finland and the Netherlands. Although they accepted that both 
candidate countries met the technical criteria, they questioned their ability to fight 
corruption, arguing that “sophisticated border machinery is of little avail if frontier 
officials are corrupt” (The Economist, 17 March 2012).   
The issue was brought to discussion in all European Councils that followed and, with 
time, Finland changed its position, while Netherlands continued to hold to its initial 
stance, for most of the time being the only Member State opposing Bulgaria’s and 
Romania’s bid to join Schengen. To change its view, the Dutch government asked for two 
consecutive positive CVM reports (Castle 2012), although this request is not stipulated in 
the pre-agreed procedures laid down in the Treaty of Luxembourg. Consequently, 
                                                          
11 Accession treaty to the European Union, signed on 25 April 2005.  
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tensions arose, especially between the Dutch and Romanian authorities12, with the latter 
blaming the first for abusing its veto right in the JHA Council. A diplomacy-by-boycott 
strategy on the part of the Romanian government followed shortly. Dutch trucks carrying 
tulips were stopped at the Western border of Romania on the grounds that they were 
supposedly contaminated with “a dangerous bacteria” (Ciocoiu 2011). Moreover, after 
returning from the winter European Council of 2011 – with the same negative answer 
from the Dutch prime-minister – President Băsescu made a public call to his national 
constituency to sabotage the sales of Dutch vegetables in Romania (V.P. 2011). The new 
Dutch ambassador to Bucharest, Johannes Hendrik Mattheus van Bonzel, who arrived 
at his post in December 2011, was also kept on hold by President Băsescu who did not 
receive his letter of credence until May 2012. Similarly, the new Romanian ambassador 
to the Netherlands, Ireny Comaroschi, who obtained the approval of Parliament in 
November 2011, was not officially appointed by presidential decree until May 2012 
(Jurnalul 2012, President of Romania 5 May 2012, President of Romania 8 May 2012). In 
addition to these actions, there are the statements of the President and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Romania who constantly affirmed that the Dutch Government was 
committing an institutional abuse, by striving to change the rules of the game during the 
game while being “in hock to the xenophobic hotheads that prop it up in parliament” (The 
Economist 17 March 2012) – an insinuation that behind the veto stands the Partij Voor 
de Vrijheid (PVV)13. This rather hostile approach failed to bring any minimal change in 
the Netherlands’ position. In fact, the effect of the ‘attacks’ did nothing but consolidate 
the rationale of blocking Romania, as pointed out in a clear and straightforward manner 
by the Dutch Minister of Immigration:  
 
“This is not about vegetables, it is about corruption. […] I hope the President respects the 
internal market, otherwise we may find one more reason why Romania does not belong in 
Schengen.”             (Gerd Leers cited in V.P. 2011) 
 
Later, Germany – together with Finland – decided to rally to the Netherlands’ position 
and in March 2013 the German minister of the interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich, declared 
that “if Romania and Bulgaria insist on a vote [in the JHA Council] the attempt will fail 
because of a German veto”. The argument he invoked was that “they have to do much 
more to fight corruption” (cited in L.C., 7 March 2013).  
                                                          
12 The Borisov government in Bulgaria generally accepted the criticism from the beginning.  
13 A far-right Dutch parliamentary party supporting the governmental coalition at that time. 
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6. THE COOPERATION AND VERIFICATION MECHANISM 
 
In the previous chapter I tried to illustrate that history and culture can hardly be 
considered authentic sources fuelling motivationally the fight against corruption in 
Bulgaria and Romania. They rather explain or support the opposite – why corruption is 
an endemic phenomenon in both countries. On the other hand, the current European 
political environment represents a more favourable factor in this matter. As seen, 
pressure exists within the EU vis-à-vis Romania and Bulgaria to address their domestic 
problems regarding corruption. This chapter investigates how the external pressure of 
the EU is translated by the two countries into concrete changes at the national level. I 
analyse the two cases separately. I start with presenting the benchmarks which each 
country is required to achieve under the CVM and then, using process-tracing, I show 
how the Commission drives the Bulgarian and Romanian leadership towards meeting 
these objectives.   
 
6.1. BULGARIA 
The European Commission established six benchmarks for Bulgaria to address (2006b: 5): 
(1) Adopt constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the 
independence and accountability of the judicial system. 
(2) Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and 
implementing a new judicial system act and the new civil procedure code. Report on 
the impact of these new laws and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, 
notably on the pre-trial phase. 
(3) Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, 
accountability and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the 
results annually. 
(4) Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of 
high-level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the 
publication of assets of high-level officials. 
(5) Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the borders 
and within local government. 
(6) Implement a strategy to fight organised crime, focussing on serious crime, money 
laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on 
new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas. 
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Since joining the EU, Bulgaria has known both left-wing and right-wing governments: 
the BSP-led coalition of prime-minister Sergei Stanishev (2005-2009) and the GERB 
government led by prime-minister Boyko Borisov (2009-2013). Similarly, the office of 
president has been assumed by politicians from both sides of the political spectrum: 
Georgi Parvanov (2002-2012) from BSP and Rosen Plevneliev (since 2012) from GERB. 
In general, the EU has been successful in pursuing all sides to work towards achieving 
the above-mentioned benchmarks, albeit in various forms and degrees.   
The first benchmark set for Bulgaria under the CVM was to adopt constitutional 
amendments so as to remove any ambiguity regarding the independence of the judiciary. 
This benchmark was largely met in the first few weeks after accession when the National 
Assembly passed the 4th amendment to the constitution on 2 February 2007, transferring 
the power of the Ministry of Justice to inspect the workings of the courts to an 
independent Inspectorate within the Supreme Judicial Council which can be petitioned 
by state authorities as well as by regular citizens (European Commission 2007a: 6). In 
this way, the interferences of the political into the judiciary had been legally cut off. 
However, the Commission opined that much work still needed to be done on the legal-
institutional level in the aftermath of the constitutional change. By 2008, some of these 
requests had been addressed by Bulgaria: a new Judicial System Act was adopted in July 
2007 and entered into force the following month; the Inspectorate to the SJC created de 
jure by the 4th amendment was also established de facto in January 2008; a new Civil 
Procedure Code was passed by the National Assembly in July 2007 and entered into force 
in March 2008 (European Commission 2008k: 3-5). Similarly, the Commission welcomed 
the “appearance of a new and powerful player”, the State Agency of National Security 
(SANS), a national-level anticorruption institution operating both as a security structure 
and a law-enforcement body (European Commission 2008k: 8; Orenstein 2009: 24). On 
the other hand, it pointed out that the 1968 Penal Code (still in effect) was “structurally 
outdated” and “ill-suited to modern types of crimes” (2008k: 7). Furthermore, in spite of 
the relative successes on the legislative level, the Commission noted – with the occasion 
of the 2008 CVM assessment – few practical results in terms of fighting corruption, 
notably at the high-level. This diagnosis was shared by the Centre for the Study of 
Democracy, a Bulgarian think-thank in Sofia, which observed that while mid-level 
corruption in the bureaucratic apparatus was generally following a downward trend, 
“political corruption involving members of the government, MPs, senior state officials, 
mayors and municipal councillors [remained] a serious challenge yet to be tackled” (CSD 
2007: 6).  
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The mismanagement of EU funds constituted the major concern. OLAF identified a 
series of problems in the implementation of different EU funding programmes in 
Bulgaria (i.e. PHARE, SAPARD etc.) such as the lack of transparency in the public 
procurement procedures, networks of conflict of interest, fraud, breaches of 
confidentiality etc. (see further European Commission 2008c; CSD 2007: 6). 
Consequently, the Commission took the most radical approach of all, freezing the funding 
programmes. The year 2008 thus marked a drastic shift in the Commission’s attitude 
towards Bulgaria by “using negative incentives in order to induce change” (Vachudova 
and Spendzaharova 2012: 7). To this, the National Assembly responded by enacting the 
Conflict of Interest Prevention and Disclosure Act 14  and by amending the Public 
Procurement Act15 (European Commission 2009c: 5-6). The  2009 summer assessment 
further noted “a momentum for reform which has yielded first results” notably in the 
area of indictments for EU fraud while simultaneously signalling that “these first 
successes have to be judged against daily reality in Bulgaria where killings linked with 
organized crime continue and known criminals are not apprehended” (2009e: 1-2).   
2009 was also an electoral year in Bulgaria and this event holds significant 
explanatory power when it comes to tracing the influence of the EU at the national level. 
The domestic political context was marked by several subsumed factors: the activity of 
BSP in office, the Commission’s monitoring of the BSP government and, most 
importantly, the perceptions of the pro-European Bulgarian public opinion. By 2009, the 
CVM reports had constantly exposed the deficiencies in the BSP’s governmental policies. 
The implications for the BSP’s public image in Bulgaria were tremendous. If in 2004 only 
35.6% of the voters saw corruption as the main problem to be dealt with, 3 years after the 
BSP took power the large majority of the public opinion (64.7%) viewed the fight against 
corruption as a top priority (Vachudova and Spendzaharova 2012: 8). Inevitably, this 
means linking corruption to the BSP. The then opposition led by Boyko Borisov 
organized its campaign around the preferences of the majority – that is, blaming the 
incumbent government for corruption (Dikov 2009) – and subsequently won the 
parliamentary elections of 5 July 2009 with 39.7% of the votes in contrast to only 17.7% 
received by the BSP (Bivol 2009). Given that the European Commission enjoyed high 
rates of approval among Bulgarians 16  and in line with the quantitative findings of 
                                                          
14 Adopted on 16 October 2008 and entered into force on 1 January 2009.  
15 Amendments adopted on 16 October 2008 and entered into force on 1 January 2009. 
16 52% of the Bulgarian public opinion declared to trust the European Commission at the time of 
the parliamentary elections according to Eurobarometer 71 of September 2009 (fieldwork done in 
June and July 2009), page 115.  
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Arnold, Sapir and Zapryanova’s (2012) according to which the public opinion in countries 
with higher levels of corruption tend to trust the supranational EU institutions more 
than their respective national institutions, it is possible to argue that the Commission 
played a noteworthy role in the 2009 elections through the criticism brought regularly 
via the CVM to the activity of the BSP government. Moreover, the very fact that the 
opposition emerged under the name of ‘Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria’ 
(GERB) is evocative for understanding the profound significance of the EU in the 
Bulgarian social and political life.  
Following the elections, the new government undertook substantive legislative 
reforms. Amendments were brought to the Judicial System Act17, strengthening the 
independence and accountability of the SJC, as well as to the Penal Procedure Code18, 
extending the investigative powers of the police and enhancing the effectiveness of 
criminal proceedings (European Commission 2010i: 5; European Commission 2011d: 3; 
European Commission 2012: 8-10). Furthermore, Bulgaria stepped-up its efforts to 
combat high-level corruption with new cases being initiated against former ministers, 
former MPs and other high-ranking officials (European Commission 2010j: 10). Similarly, 
Mario Nikolov, a notorious Bulgarian businessman, was sentenced in June 2010 to 12 
years of prison 19  for draining EUR 7.5 million from the EU agriculture programme 
SAPARD (Novinite 30 June 2010). In spite of this emblematic case, the Commission 
noted that few cases of corruption had actually reached conclusion in the courts and 
criticised Bulgaria for the procedural delays. In response, Boyko Borisov stated:  
 
“We accept all the comments made; we have reached similar conclusions ourselves. […] 
We will focus on developing the “political will” we were praised for in the report. […] We 
are going to take more action in the coming next weeks and months” (cited in Petrov and 
Hope 20 July 2010) 
 
Nevertheless, the latest CVM report continued to refer to “lack of results” in the area 
of fighting high-level corruption although a “satisfactory legal framework is in place to 
allow the prosecution of corruption-related offences” (European Commission 2012j: 20). 
To this date, there is no record of ministers or parliamentarians convicted for corruption 
in Bulgaria.  
 
                                                          
17 Amendments adopted in December 2010 and entered into force in January 2011.  
18 Amendments adopted in April 2010 and entered into force in May 2010.  
19 Nikolov considered himself a “scapegoat” for the malfunctioning judicial system of Bulgaria 
(Novite 30 June 2010).  
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Table 4. Progress noted by the Commission under the CVM in Bulgaria 
 
CVM  
report 
Progress  
Major 
legislative 
changes 
Major 
institutional 
changes 
Key words used 
to describe 
track record  
(h-l corruption) 
MPs and 
ministers 
convicted  
with prison 
sentences 
-1st- 
27 June 2007 
constitutional 
amendments 
adopted 
- little evidence 0 
-2nd- 
4 February 2008 
new Judicial 
System Act 
adopted; new 
Civil Procedure 
Code adopted 
SJC and 
Inspectorate to 
SJC are 
established 
assessment 
impossible   
0 
-3rd- 
23 July 2008 
new Civil 
Procedure Code 
entered into force 
SANS is 
established 
number of cases 
is negligible  
0 
-4th- 
12 February 2009 
Law on Conflict 
of Interest 
adopted; Public 
Procurement Act 
amended; 
joint 
investigation 
teams SANS-
Ministry of 
Interior 
negative trend 0 
-5th- 
22 July 2009 
- - 
capacity to 
enforce the law 
has not increased 
0 
-6th- 
23 March 2010 
- - 
continuously poor 
results 
0 
-7th- 
20 July 2010 
Penal Procedure 
Code amended  
- 
stepped-up 
efforts, new 
indictments 
0 
-8th- 
18 February 2011 
Judicial System 
Act amended; 
Law on Conflict 
of Interest 
amended  
- 
acquittals in 
emblematic cases 
0 
-9th- 
20 July 2011 
- 
structural 
reforms: police, 
criminal court 
system 
no convincing 
results 
0 
-10th- 
8 February 2012 
- - 
no convincing 
results 
0 
-11th- 
18 July 2012 
- - 
mixed results: no. 
of cases has 
increased, but 
few cases reach 
court, high no. of 
acquittals 
0 
Sources: The information is collected from the CVM reports issued by the European Commission on the 
progress achieved by Bulgaria: COM(2007)377; COM(2008)63; COM(2008)495; COM(2009)69; COM(2009)402; 
COM(2010)112; COM(2010)400; COM(2011)81; COM(2011)459; COM(2012)57; COM(2012)411 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm. 
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6.2. ROMANIA  
The CVM benchmarks set by the European Commission for Romania are the following 
four (2006a: 5):  
(1) Ensure a more transparent, and efficient judicial process notably by enhancing the 
capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and 
monitor the impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes. 
(2) Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets, 
incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory 
decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken. 
(3) Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-partisan 
investigations into allegations of high-level corruption. 
(4) Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within 
the local government. 
Since accession, virtually all major political parties in Romania have been in government: 
PNL and PDL (December 2004 – April 2007); PNL and UDMR (minority government 
supported in parliament by PSD, April 2007 – December 2008); PSD and PDL (December 
2008 – October 2009); PDL and UDMR (December 2009 – April 2012); PSD and PNL 
(since May 2012). The only constant on the Romanian political arena has been President 
Traian Băsescu (PDL) elected for two consecutive terms (200420 and 200921 respectively). 
In spite of this generally changing political landscape, the European Commission notes 
that “the track record of Romania against high-level corruption has been one of the 
important advances under the CVM” (2013a: 4). The establishment and consolidation of 
the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) and of the National Integrity Agency 
(ANI) together with the adoption of a corresponding new package of fundamental judicial 
laws – all under the attentive observation and guidance of the Commission – stand as the 
main achievements of Romania in the fight against high-level corruption.   
The DNA was created in the pre-accession phase (2002) with the purpose of tackling 
mid- and high-level corruption and as such it operates under the authority of the General 
Prosecutor and the High Court of Cassation and Justice (Orenstein 2009: 24). 
Nevertheless, soon after its establishment, multiple initiatives to reverse the 
institutional development of the DNA emerged, particularly from parliament. MPs 
sought, for instance, to change the nomination and revocation procedures of the General 
Prosecutor and Chief Prosecutor of the DNA several times (2006, 2007, 2008, 2012), in 
                                                          
20 On a fervent anticorruption platform against PSD. 
21 On a platform regarding state modernization and a campaign against the media ‘moguls’.  
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the direction of placing the two key positions under the political control of the 
parliamentary majority, thus compromising their institutional independence. The 
Commission expressed its critical position on this matter consistently, either by arguing 
that early dismissals or replacements of key position holders “can be damaging to the 
continuity of the reform process” (2007b: 16) or by stating expressly that the 
“Parliament’s attempt to change the nomination and revocation procedures ran counter 
to the obligations Romania took at accession and appears a clear attempt to undermine 
the effectiveness of the system” (2009i: 12). Moreover, undertaking an active role of 
institution-builder, the Commission did not refrain from stressing that the DNA lies on 
solid legal foundations (hence the unjustified claims to disturb the stability) by pointing 
out that “all exceptions of unconstitutionality related to the DNA’s basic legislation have 
been rejected by the Constitutional Court” (2010j: 15) and labelling the absence of 
amendments to the DNA’s existing legal framework as “a positive development” (2008j: 
12). Despite the pressure in parliament to reorganize or even abolish the DNA as one MP 
has recently suggested (Cristiana Anghel 11 April 2013), the status and competences of 
this institution have remained unchanged.  
The Commission’s preference for stability can be seen in light of DNA’s capacity to 
deliver relatively good outcomes. In the technical report accompanying the latest full 
CVM report, the Commission remarked that “[s]ince 2007 DNA has continued to build a 
convincing track record of impartial investigation” taking forward cases against 
individuals from all political parties (2012i: 26). More specifically, during 2007 and 2012, 
DNA indicted a considerable number of current or former high-level officials, among 
whom 14 MPs, 9 ministers, 11 officials with rank of state secretary or deputy state 
secretary, 104 mayors and deputy mayors, 6 presidents and vice-presidents of county 
councils, 9 prefects and deputy prefects, and 18 directors and general directors of state-
owned companies (2012i: 27). In 2012, the courts convicted one former minister and two 
MPs (one of whom is former prime-minister Adrian Năstase22), who became the first 
senior Romanian politicians to be sent to prison for corruption (European Commission 
2012i: 29). Since the latest full and interim assessments, the list has become longer. 
More recently, two current MPs, three former ministers, one former general and head of 
the Romanian army and one president of county council have received prison sentences 
for corruption-related deeds after being prosecuted by the DNA (Biro Attila 25 February 
2013; V.M. 18 March 2013; Victor Cozmei 20 May 2013).  
                                                          
22 Adrian Năstase (PSD) served as prime minister of Romania during 2000 and 2004. He was 
imprisoned during June 2012 and February 2013 for illegal party financing. 
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Although these results cannot be linked directly to the EU or considered direct effects 
of Europeanization, they can be seen as indirect consequences of the Commission’s 
permanent pressure on the relevant political actors (i.e. parliament, government) to 
maintain and strengthen the legal-institutional framework of DNA. One member of the 
General Prosecutor’s Office even stated explicitly that the EU “sustains” the DNA and 
that if not for the EU, the DNA would no longer exist (George Bocsan cited in Orenstein 
2009: 21). It is of course always difficult to establish causal mechanism between a 
recommendation not to do something (i.e. the Commission’s suggestions not to amend the 
DNA’s law) and a lack of action. Nevertheless, pressure to weaken the institution 
certainly existed in parliament, especially when considering that many MPs themselves 
were being targeted by the DNA. Incentives on their part existed undoubtedly. This was 
not carried out, I argue, because the leadership of the parties in government understood 
the magnitude of the message which this political action would have sent to Brussels and 
the impact of the EU’s reaction on the pro-European Romanian electorate. DNA has been 
portrayed constantly by the Commission as the institution combating high-level political 
corruption, with generally good results. An attack on the DNA would have most likely 
been perceived abroad as a significant regress in the reform process. The likelihood of 
this reaction on the part of the EU stands out particularly when mirroring this 
counterfactual scenario to the events that shaped ANI.   
ANI has been another institution welcomed “enthusiastically” by the Commission 
(Vachudova and Spendzharova 2012: 11). It was established in May 200723 as an agency 
destined to “verify assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest of a large 
number of higher public- and elected officials” (European Commission 2007b: 12), thus 
performing a threefold role: (1) force all public servants to disclose their assets by making 
compulsory the submission of wealth and interest declarations; (2) investigate officials 
who cannot explain a discrepancy higher than EUR 10,000 between their wealth and 
their income; (3) seize unexplained assets following a court’s order authorizing 
confiscation (European Commission 2007b: 14; Vachudova and Spendzharova 2012: 11). 
However, in April 2010, many parts of ANI’s legal framework were declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that ANI had taken a quasi-
judicial character. The parliament then adopted a new law in June establishing a weaker 
ANI, deposed of its right to confiscate unjustified assets, and introducing less 
comprehensive wealth and interest declarations (European Commission 2010d: 5). In 
response, the Commission’s CVM report of 20 July 2010 was highly critical, affirming 
                                                          
23 As part of benchmark 2 under the CVM.  
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that “the new law on ANI represents a significant step back in the fight against 
corruption and breaches commitments Romania has taken upon accession” and further 
calling on Bucharest “to adopt a new law in conformity with Romania’s obligations” 
(European Commission 2010d: 5). Later the same day, President Băsescu held a press 
conference specifically on the CVM report where he announced: 
“Following this report, I have decided to use my constitutional right to summon parliament 
in an extraordinary session24 [...] scheduled for the first half of August because I believe it 
is necessary to bring about a solution to a few problems. The first and foremost is ANI’s law. 
It is our commitment and the government and the parliament have the obligation to shape 
this commitment in an adequate form, agreed by the European Commission”. (President of 
Romania 20 July 2010) 
Thereafter, “Romania responded swiftly to the Commission’s recommendation by 
adopting a new law on the National Integrity Agency (ANI) [in August 2010] which re-
established the possibility to seek the confiscation of unjustified wealth” (European 
Commission 2011j: 8). Exceptions of unconstitutionality have been raised ever since; 
however, the Constitutional Court ruled against all of them (R.M. 29 April 2013).  
In general, ANI demonstrated relative effectiveness since its creation, with some 
7,000 verifications commenced (4,000 completed) resulting in more than 500 findings of 
integrity violations (European Commission 2012i: 21). Furthermore, the Commission 
notes that “ANI has identified more conflict of interests in the six months since 
November 2010, than in the entire two year period they were operational under their 
previous legal framework” (2011j: 9). On the other hand, ANI also issued four 
incompatibility reports in 2012 against ministers and senior officials but none stepped 
down from office for this reason and contested the decisions in court. As the Commission 
remarks in its latest interim report, in spite of the reality that ANI wins the large 
majority of appeals against its rulings, its decisions are still being frequently challenged 
in court (2013a: 10).  
The third major advancement concerns the wide-ranging reform of the judiciary, 
which includes the adoption of the new Criminal and Civil codes in 2009 and the 
corresponding procedural codes in 2010, as part of benchmark 1 under the CVM. So far, 
only the Civil Code and the Civil Procedure Code have entered into force, in October 2011 
and February 2013 respectively (European Commission 2012i: 5; V.M. 14 February 2013), 
while the other two codes are “tentatively scheduled for February 2014” (European 
Commission 2013a: 8). When entering into force, the latter two will effectively replace 
the existing body of criminal law, adopted in 1968 during the communist regime.   
                                                          
24 Parliament was in recess at that time.  
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Table 5. Progress noted by the Commission under the CVM in Romania 
 
CVM  
report 
Progress  
Major 
legislative 
changes 
Major 
institutional 
changes 
Key words used 
to describe 
track record  
(h-l corruption) 
MPs and 
ministers 
convicted  
with prison 
sentences 
-1st- 
27 June 2007 
ANI law adopted - 
positive track 
record 
0 
-2nd- 
4 February 2008 
- - 
convincing 
results not yet 
demonstrated 
0 
-3rd- 
23 July 2008 
- - good track record 0 
-4th- 
12 February 2009 
- - 
maintained 
positive track 
record 
0 
-5th- 
22 July 2009 
new Criminal 
Code adopted; 
new Civil Code 
adopted 
ANI becomes 
fully operational 
maintained 
positive track 
record 
0 
-6th- 
23 March 2010 
- - 
continuously 
convincing track 
record 
0 
-7th- 
20 July 2010 
ANI law declared 
unconstitutional; 
new ANI law 
adopted; new 
Civil Procedure 
Code adopted; 
new Criminal 
Procedure Code 
adopted 
ANI is abolished; 
ANI is 
‘resurrected’ in a 
weaker form 
good, stable track 
record 
0 
-8th- 
18 February 2011 
“Small Reform 
Law” (judiciary) 
adopted; new 
ANI law adopted 
ANI is re-
established 
maintained 
convincing track 
record 
0 
-9th- 
20 July 2011 
- - 
maintained good 
track record 
0 
-10th- 
8 February 2012 
new Civil Code 
entered into force 
- 
continued to 
carry forward a 
series of 
important cases 
0 
-11th- 
18 July 2012 
- - 
convincing track 
record  
3 
-12th- 
30 January 2013* 
- - 
one of the most 
important 
advances under 
the CVM 
0 
*In January 2013 the Commission issued a special interim report on Romania to assess the internal events that 
followed the constitutional crisis of summer 2012. Although the document concentrates especially on the rule of 
law, comments regarding the fight against high-level corruption are also included.  
Sources: The information is collected from the CVM reports issued by the European Commission on the 
progress achieved by Romania: COM(2007)378; COM(2008)62; COM(2008)494; COM(2009)70; COM(2009)401; 
COM(2010)113; COM(2010)401; COM(2011)80; COM(2011)460; COM(2012)56; COM(2012)410; COM(2013)47; 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm. 
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7. EVALUATION 
 
The parallel between Bulgaria and Romania points to a few noteworthy similarities 
regarding the fight against high-level corruption. First, the EU has managed to trigger 
some change leading to relative progress in both countries through the adaptational 
pressure it exerted over the domestic political actors. An overview of the consequences of 
the CVM in Bulgaria and Romania, structured along the indicators set in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis, can be found in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. As seen, in both cases the 
CVM contributed – indirectly through the national governments and parliaments – to the 
adoption of new legislation and the establishment of new institutions (i.e. SANS, ANI etc.) 
strengthening the fight against corruption. This evidence comes to the support of H1. 
Formally, the pressure exercised by the EU originates in the Commission’s CVM; 
however, the real leverage lies in how (some25 of) the other Member States perceive 
Bulgaria and Romania’s progress under the CVM in the prospect of acceding to the 
Schengen zone26 . Prime-minister Borisov organized its political platform around the 
‘European’ theme and generally accepted the criticism of the Commission and of the 
blocking minority of Member States in the JHA Council (Vachudova and Spendzharova 
2012: 12). Although the Romanian authorities have been more vocal against notably the 
Netherlands, accusing it of breaching treaty provisions and of abusing its veto power 
when linking Schengen to the CVM, in practice they have worked towards addressing the 
requests. Recently, President Băsescu has made a public statement declaring that 
Schengen membership represents a “national objective for Romania” and therefore 
Romania needs to continue to work on the CVM benchmarks as the only way27 to attain 
this goal (President of Romania 4 March 2013).   
Second, in persuading Bulgaria and Romania to comply with its recommendations, 
the Commission has adopted three different attitudes/styles within the CVM framework: 
(1) acknowledge and reward declaratively all positive undertakings; (2) prevent possible 
                                                          
25 Only the Netherlands and – more recently – Germany have conditioned their vote in the JHA 
Council regarding the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen zone to the progress 
achieved by these countries in the fight against corruption, as reflected by the CVM reports. 
Nevertheless, given the voting system in this particular subject (unanimity), it is sufficient that 
one Member State conditions its vote to the CVM in order to enforce this leverage. 
26 The Commission does not support “the tendency of some Member States to make a political link 
between Schengen and the CVM” and noted that “[t]he Schengen process has its own tools to 
assess readiness: the CVM is not designed to duplicate or replace these” (2013b: 2). 
27 Since the official Schengen criteria have already been met.  
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deviations or regress by exposing and criticizing publicly all political intentions to alter 
reforms; (3) criticize post-factum actions aimed at weakening the legal-institutional order. 
In this sense, the Commission has been more effective in imposing its preferences 
particularly when using negative incentives, such as critiques, threats or even sanctions. 
The fact that after the Commission’s harsh assessment at the end of July 2010, the 
Romanian parliament was rapidly mobilized during the summer recess and in a matter 
of days28 passed a new law on ANI which incorporated the preferences of the Commission, 
says much about the power of EU negative incentives over the domestic political will. 
Similarly, the suspension of EU funding programmes in Bulgaria leading to the adoption 
of the Conflict of Interest Prevention and Disclosure Act and the Public Procurement Act 
as well as the Commission’s strong approach to the attempts to change the DNA’s law in 
Romania represent illustrative examples supporting H2.   
Third, the CVM-Schengen pressure has also created a side effect on the part of the 
indicted or convicted defendants: the ‘scapegoat excuse’. As with Mario Nikolov in 
Bulgaria, former prime-minister Adrian Năstase and George Becali (former MEP and 
MP) affirmed that their sentences were based on the rationale that their country has to 
show a ‘convincing track record’ in order to enter Schengen (Dadacus 20 May 2013). 
Interestingly, a poll conducted by the Romanian Institute for Evaluation and Strategy 
(IRES), a sociological think-thank based in Cluj-Napoca, shows that 42% of the 
Romanian public opinion believe that Becali was sacrificed for the sake of Schengen 
(IRES 2013: 6). Later, Becali admitted that he is guilty for some of the corruption-related 
accusations presented by the DNA (Attila 27 May 2013). If not handled properly by the 
relevant institutions, the ‘scapegoat effect’ might undermine the credibility of the 
judiciary in the long run.  
Notwithstanding, the two cases contrast each other in one very important respect: 
practical results. While both countries undertook various steps to modernize their legal 
framework and insure more balanced and clearly defined relations between the judiciary 
and the political, concrete results in the fight against high-level corruption have been 
registered so far only in Romania. Since the very first CVM reports, the Commission has 
consistently praised the DNA and ANI (and other institutions within the judicial branch) 
in Romania for their good track record 29  to the point that in January 2013 the 
Commission stated explicitly: 
 
                                                          
28 The new law was adopted by the Senate in an extraordinary session on 24 August 2010 and 
ratified by President Băsescu on 31 August 2010 (Agerpres 31 August 2010).  
29 See notably column 4 in Table 5. 
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“The past few months have seen the Public Ministry, the Directorate-General for 
Anticorruption and the High Court all continuing to work professionally and impartially, 
sometimes under extreme pressure. The resilience of these institutions so far reinforces 
the conclusion that their track record on high-level corruption is one of the most 
significant signs of progress achieved by Romania under the CVM.” (European 
Commission 2013a: 10) 
 
Conversely, no such statement appears in any of the CVM reports on Bulgaria, in 
spite of the occasionally acknowledged efforts. The difference between the two countries 
regarding results is sourced in two main reasons. 
First, it is a matter of institutional design and clarity of responsibilities. In Romania, 
the duty and power to prosecute officials for corruption-related activities have been 
concentrated principally at the level of one institution, the DNA, with conflict of interests 
and asset monitoring being allocated to ANI. In Bulgaria, these powers are dissipated 
into a web of organizations; functional overlaps being frequent (see further European 
Commission 2012j). For example, asset verification officially falls into the responsibility 
of the National Audit Office; however, this organization “does not have investigative 
powers to further look into suspicious cases” and therefore has to rely on the assistance 
of other institutions, such as SANS or the National Revenue Agency (European 
Commission 2012j: 21-22). At the same time, the prevention of conflict of interest is 
overseen by another body, the Committee on Anti-Corruption, Conflict of Interests and 
Parliamentary Ethics (CACCIPE) established by the Bulgarian parliament in the 
aftermath of the suspension of EU funds in 2008 (European Commission 2012j: 27). 
Furthermore, the Commission signalled that the attributions of SANS are not clearly 
defined (both in relation to its scope and in relation to other institutions) and this affects 
negatively the capacity to deliver results (European Commission 2012j: 31). 
Second, it is also a matter of time and institutional maturation. While in Romania the 
DNA was created relatively early in the integration phase (5 years before accession), 
many of the institutions tackling high-level corruption in Bulgaria have been set up only 
very recently. Almost one decade of institutionalization had to pass until the DNA 
managed to indict and then persuade the courts to convict senior politicians and this 
taking place in a not so favourable national context – even today, high-ranking officials 
criticize the activity of the DNA and just 40% of the Romanian public opinion trust this 
institution30 (IRES 2012: 28). This applies not only when comparing the DNA to its 
counterparts in Bulgaria, but also when mirroring the institutional development of the 
                                                          
30 For comparison, the same percentage of the respondents (40%) trust parliament (IRES 2012: 18).  
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DNA with that of ANI. ANI has indeed shown some results; nevertheless, as seen, many 
of its decisions are disputed in court by the defendants, and ministers with 
incompatibility reports refuse to step down from office. Rather than indicating a deficit of 
legality (which is not the case with ANI given that the Constitutional Court has rejected 
all exceptions of unconstitutionality), this highlights a problem of acceptance or 
legitimacy. In line with Mungiu-Pippidi’s reasoning (2006), it should not be forgotten 
that these institutions did not come about at the genuine request of the public or of the 
elite and through a natural process modelled by internal historical experiences, but as a 
benchmark to be achieved under the CVM. Thus, more time is needed for these 
institutions so as to strengthen their legitimacy in relation to the domestic public. Schiff 
(2010) and Kahler (2011) identify three types of legitimacy: normative (the legal grounds 
on which the institution is built); operational (whether the institution is able to perform 
in accordance with its normative commitments); and consequential (whether the 
institution is successful in delivering results in the long term). Given that the 
anticorruption institutions in Bulgaria and Romania have resulted from negotiation with 
the EU (an outside actor), the most suitable way for strengthening the moral authority of 
these bodies is by demonstrating ability to deliver successful results (consequential 
legitimacy). This remains an important challenge for the two countries to address in the 
future. 
In general, these differences reflect the distinct manner in which the mediating 
factors at the Bulgarian and Romanian national levels have understood to translate into 
practice the preferences of the Commission, and illustrate the fact that Europeanization 
is not a direct process (that is, EU institutions and actors cannot by themselves generate 
change at the national level).  
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8. FINAL REMARKS 
 
 
8.1. CONCLUSIONS 
In this Master thesis I have argued that the EU has had tangible impact in triggering 
and supporting comprehensive reforms aimed at fighting high-level corruption in 
Bulgaria and Romania. In this sense, the Commission’s Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism established in December 2006 as a supranational instrument to monitor and 
evaluate the post-accession evolution of these two states has been an efficient tool, 
contributing to keeping the Bulgarian and Romanian leadership on the path towards 
fundamental change. The CVM has demonstrated its success notably when coupled by 
some Member States with Schengen-membership conditionality (despite that this link 
has not been endorsed by the Commission or by Bulgaria and Romania). 
Correspondingly, domestic political will to fight high-level corruption increased when the 
Commission – along with other Member States – resorted to negative incentives (higher 
adaptational pressure) such as threats or actual sanctions.  
Overall, some progress has been achieved in both countries since accession, albeit in 
different degrees. In accordance with the benchmarks set under the CVM, new 
legislation has been enacted, strengthening the independence of the judiciary from the 
political and generally easing the investigation into high-level corruption cases. Similarly, 
anticorruption institutions have emerged and matured. The number of indicted 
dignitaries has increased in both countries; nevertheless, so far only in Romania MPs 
and ministers have been convicted by the courts with definitive prison sentences. The 
differences regarding Bulgaria’s and Romania’s track record lie in when and how the 
mediating actors at the national level (i.e. the governments and the parliaments) have 
decided to act upon the criticism presented by the EU. In contrast to Romania – which 
put in place a coherent institutional system relatively early in the integration process – 
Bulgaria still needs to address the functional overlaps existing between several of its 
organizations in order to consolidate the capacity to deliver results.  
At the same time, it is still too soon for definitive conclusions. In realistic terms, six 
years of EU integration are insufficient to eradicate a century-old, deep-rooted societal 
habit inherited from the Ottoman occupation and the communist regime. Nonetheless, 
the incipient results shown up until this point are encouraging. Should Bulgaria and 
Romania continue to work diligently on meeting the CVM benchmarks, corruption will 
cease to be an endemic phenomenon by default.  
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8.2. LIMITATIONS 
This thesis suffers from three main shortcomings. First, the CVM on Bulgaria and 
Romania is still ongoing and there is no clear date set for when it should expire31. 
Therefore, my analysis will have focused only on one segment (2007-2013) of the entire 
period when the CVM was into effect. It will be interesting to observe how the two states 
act domestically once the pressure of the CVM is entirely removed. Will the legal and 
institutional changes operated during the time of the CVM at the recommendation of the 
Commission be maintained after the CVM ends? In principle, according to the logic of 
Europeanization, the CVM (as an expression of adaptational pressure) will gradually 
fade away as the discrepancies between the two sides (the EU on one hand, and Bulgaria 
and Romania on the other) are reduced. At that end-point, the states and their societies 
will have presumably learned from their integration experiences and will have changed 
deeply, making the CVM redundant. Moreover, the institutions set under the CVM will 
have also acquired moral authority within their respective countries through 
consequential legitimacy. Since these transformations would be so profound and genuine, 
there would be no temptation to reverse the reforms. The reforms themselves will have 
induced new socio-political paradigms, marking a fundamental rupture from the habits 
of the past. Nevertheless, this supposition needs to be tested properly.  
Second, although causality (i.e. between EU preferences and domestic action) is 
indispensable for the analysis of Europeanization, a comparative approach including a 
non-EU state or a state not applying for EU membership (that is, a case where EU 
adaptational pressure is absent) would have strengthened the argument. For example, 
Ukraine and Moldova share many characteristics with Bulgaria and Romania (culture, 
historical experiences, corruption etc.) but differ on their EU-membership status. Would 
the political will to fight high-level corruption in Bulgaria and Romania still be at the 
intensity it is today had the two countries not been Member States of the EU (i.e. like 
Ukraine or Moldova)? A comparison of this kind – around the same dependent variable – 
provides the methodological advantage of the ‘what if’ scenario (counterfactual analysis).  
Third, more research is needed on the historical and (especially) cultural dimensions. 
Here, I discussed history and culture as contextual factors, but more investigation is 
definitively needed in order to establish how precisely historical processes shaped culture 
as well as to determine the exact weight of culture in the equation concerning the 
dependent variable observed in this study.     
                                                          
31 Officially, the CVM will be repealed “when all the benchmarks have been satisfactorily fulfilled” 
(see European Commission 2006a: 3 and European Commission 2006b: 3).  
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8.3. IMPLICATIONS  
This investigation opens the door to further theoretical and policy-related discussions. 
On the theoretical side, it is first of all worth noting the amplitude and profoundness of 
Europeanization by tracing its effects on the multiple societal layers: from the legal-
institutional level down to the cultural. I have shown here that, by Europeanization, 
national laws and institutions can change at the request of the EU. But laws and 
institutions are designed to impact social behaviour. Future research should therefore 
address this link by tracking down the long-term consequences of Europeanization at the 
level of national cultures and identities. This academic demarche needs to be carried out 
jointly by political scientists, cultural anthropologists and representatives of other 
relevant fields of study. Second, the examples of Bulgaria and Romania reinforce the 
neofunctionalist argument of the ‘spill-over effect’ (the expanding roles of the EU). With 
Bulgaria and Romania inside the EU, the fight against corruption has de facto become an 
issue on the agenda of the Union. Accordingly, by establishing the CVM, the Commission 
added a new task to its list of duties. Third, the literature on EU integration abounds in 
appreciations on the democratic deficit of the EU; the equality deficit, on the other hand, 
has received less attention. Although officially all Member States are equal, in practice it 
turns out – as with the cases observed in this thesis – that some are actively involved in 
shaping EU policies and legislation while other enjoy a second-rate status, taking lessons 
and being constantly supervised.     
From a policy perspective, the relative success demonstrated so far by the CVM in 
Bulgaria and Romania should be fructified on a wider EU scale. Creating a ‘CVM’ for all 
Member States would not only help diagnose the problems in every country and allow for 
accurate comparisons within the EU, but would also reduce – to some extent – the deficit 
of equality discussed above. A step in this direction has already been taken recently. In a 
letter32 signed by the ministers of foreign affairs of Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark 
and Finland a proposal was put forward to create a EU-wide control mechanism under 
the Commission “to safeguard fundamental values in [the] Member States” by placing 
“greater emphasis on promoting a culture of respect for the rule of law” and sanctioning, 
when required, the deviant conduct of individual Member States. A universal and 
permanent system of this kind could provide guarantees that the core values and 
principles of the EU are observed across all Member States at all times. 
                                                          
32 Letter of 6 March 2013 by Guido Westerwelle (Germany), Frans Timmermans (Netherlands), 
Villy Søvndal (Denmark) and Erkki Tuomioja (Finland) addressed to José Manuel Barroso, 
President of the European Commission.  
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